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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
H. E. COLWELL and EDITH
C:. COLWELL, his wife,

Plaintiff
vs.
UPPER CANAL IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Defendant

t;PPER CANAL IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff
Case No.
and Respondent
11390
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah, and MARVIN G. JENSON,
OSCAR HANSON, JR., and PHILIP
R. BLOMQUIST,
Third-Party Defendants
and Appellants.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Upper Canal
C:nrnpany as a third-party plaintiff to recover dam<lgt>~ and injunctive relief against Salt Lake County
llll the theory that the county is liable to the plaintiffs,
H. E. Cohvell and Edith C. Colwell, his wife, for any
and all damages which they have sustained.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOvYER COURT
The trial judge, Stewart M. Hanson, granted the
motion of the Upper Canal to file its third-party complaint against Salt Lake County and the individual
commissioners for the said county.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The third-party defendants ask that the ruling
of the trial judge be reversed and the motion of the
Upper Canal to file its third-party complaint be
denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 19, 1968, the plaintiffs, Colwells,
filed their complaint asking for $3,000.00 compensatory damages and also for a permanent injunction against the defendant, Upper Canal Inigation
Company. [R.1 J The complaint alleged that the
Upper Canal was negligent in ( 1 ) Failing to properly
construct their canal facilities, ( 2) failing to maintain their canal facilities, and ( 3) By allowing too
much vvater to enter said canal. [R.1 tf4]
On August 8, 1968, the Upper Canal filed a thirclparty complaint against Salt Lake County, Marvin G.
Jenson, Oscar Hanson, Jr. and Philip R. Blomquist as
the duly elected commissioners for the county. [ R. 5 l
Paragraph 8 of the said third-party complaint allege~
that:
2

'' ... if the property of H. E. Colwell and Edith
C. Colwell, his wife, has been damaged as
alleged and set forth in their complaint, such
damage has been solely and proximately
caused by the third-party defendants herein
by the use of said Upper Canal as a storm
drainage of waters from the streets and roads
owned by Salt Lake County ... " [R.7J

On August 8, 1968, the Upper Canal also filed an
answer and counterclaim to the plaintiffs' complaint.
rR.11 J The answer alleged that Salt Lake County is
'olely liable to the plaintiffs for any damage the
plaintiffs have sustained. [R.12] The counterclaim
alleged that the plaintiffs had caused their own damages by building a fence and further encroaching
upon the easement belonging to the Upper Canal
Company. CR.13]
On August 15, 1968, the third-party defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint
lR.26J, and also a notice of motion. [R.24] This
motion was heard on August 20, 1968, before the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, at which time the
Upper Canal asked leave to amend its complaint.
[H.'.28 J The trial judge granted permission to do so.
On September 4, 1968, an amended third-party
complaint was filed. [R.32] This time the Upper
Caual Company alleged that Salt Lake County was
licible to the Upper Canal Company for all their
clcunages. [R.34 tf8 J No change was made in the
original answer which raised as an affirmative
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defense that Salt Lake County was solely liable to
the plaintiffs for their damages. [ R.11 ]
Thereafter on September 6, 1968, Salt Lake
County and the individual commissioners filed a
motion to dismiss the amended third-party complaint
[ R.39] ; and at the same time they filed their notice
of motion. [R.37]
On September 10, 1968, a hearing was held before
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson and on September
16, 1968, an order was signed denying the third-party
defendants' motion to dismiss. [R.41]
On October 4, 1968, the said third-party defendants filed their petition for an intermediate appeal
with the Supreme Court [R.47]; and the said petition
was granted on October 17, 1968. [R.46]
POINT I
RULE 14 OF THE UT AH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE UPPER
CANAL TO FILE ITS AMENDED THIRD-PARTY
COl\1PLAINT AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY
AND/OR THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS
THEREOF BASED UPON THE PRESENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE SAID THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT.
The original complaint filed in this case is an
action in tort in which the plaintiffs as property mYners claim $3,000.00 compensatory damages as \Ydl as

an injunction against the Upper Canal. The basis
for their relief is set out in paragraph 4 "'·herein the
plaintiffs allege that the defendant
" ... failed to properly construct and has failed
to properly maintain said canal and defendant
has allowed too much water to enter said
canal and that by reason of the foregoing acts
of defendant the waters of said canal have from
time to time escaped from the canal and have
flowed over and upon the said lands of the
plaintiff ... " [R.1 tf4J
lt is obvious that the property owners are alleging
negligence against the Upper Canal Company for
three ( 3) reasons, to-wit: ( 1) Failure to properly construct the canal, (2) Failure to properly maintain the
canal, and ( 3) Allowing too much water to enter
said canal.
The essence of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of
the third-party complaint filed by the Upper Canal
is that Salt Lake County is responsible for the water
tlrn tis in the Upper Canal and that consequently Salt
Lake County is liable to the property owners for any
damages which they have sustained and that the
Upper Canal is not liable in any way. The answer
also places the liability on Salt Lake County. By
attempting to shift the blame over to the third-party
defendants and by saying that they are liable to the
plaintiffs for all of their damages, the said Upper
Curnl has misconstrned the use of Rule 14.
5

Rule 14 (a) as amended in 1963 reads in part as
follows:
"(a) When defendant may bring in third
party. At any time after commencement of
the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be
served upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiffs claim against him ... "

It is clear that the rule can be used only when the
third-party defendants are liable to the third-party
plaintiffs. It is obvious that it has no application
when the allegations are that the third-party defendants are liable to the original plaintiffs in the action
rather than to the third-party plaintiffs. [ 3 Moore's
Federal Practice 574, §14.11 "Impleader of Joint TortFeasor." See note 17J The original complaint stated
that the third-party defendants were liable to the
plaintiffs for their damages. It is true that in the
amended third-party complaint the Upper Canal
Company attempts to draft its language to allege
some liability on the part of Salt Lake County to the
Upper Canal Irrigation Company. However, the
essential allegations of the amended complaint
remoin the same as those in the original comploint
and the affirmative defense in the answer alleging
Solt Lake County was the party responsible to thr
plaintiffs for their dmnages was not changed.

In the case of Hardman v. "l\1athews, et al, 1 Ut.
6

2d 110, 262 P.2d 748 ( 1953), the Utah Supreme Court
unanimously held that Rule 14 does not apply to a
negligence case where the original defendant attempts to shift the blame over to a third party. In the
Hardman case the defendants were the drivers and
OV\'ners of an automobile which collided with a car
in which the plaintiffs were riding as passengers.
\Vhen the plaintiffs brought the suit against the
uefendants, the defendants sought to interplead the
owner and driver of the car in which the plaintiffs
were riding as passengers. The defendants relied on
Rule 14 to justify the joinder claiming that the hosts
\Vere the sole cause of the injuries or at least a contributing cause. They reasoned that such being the
case they were entitled to have the court find the hosts
were liable to the plaintiffs for their injuries and that
the defendants were not. The Supreme Court held
that Rule 14 was not applicable in such a situation
and said in part:
"If the negligence of the interpleaded parties
was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries as defendants maintain, the latter would
have a complete defense to the action without
the joinder."

In the instant case, the Upper Canal Company filed
its answer alleging as an affirmative defense that Salt
Lake County was solely liable for any damage the
plaintiffs may have sustained. [R.11 J As pointed out
in Hardman, if the Upper Canal can prove this
7

<lefense, then it has a complete defense to the
action of the original plaintiffs and there is no need
for the joinder.
The court stated m Hardman that if the thirdparty plaintiffs were alleging that the third-party
defendants were concurrently or jointly negligent
with them, then the joinder would avail the thirdparty plaintiffs nothing since contribution cannot be
had between joint or concurrent tort-feasors unless
sanctioned by statute, there being none such in Utah.
Similarily in the instant case it appears clear that the
Upper Canal is alleging that either ( 1) Salt Lakr
County is solely and completely liable for any damages which the plaintiffs have sustained; in which
case the Upper Canal would have a complete defense
to the action as stated in Hardman supra; or (2) the
Upper Canal Company is alleging that Salt Lake
County is in some way concurrently or jointly liable
with them in the damages which the plaintiffs have
sustained. Point ( 2) follows because of the three ( 3 J
original grounds of negligence alleged by the plaintiffs, Cohvells, only the third ground is raised against
Salt Lake County-that too much 'Nater had been
allowed in the canal. Clearly Salt Lake County had
nothing to do with the construction or maintenance
of the canal vvhich are the substance of the other two
grounds of negligence. However, Salt Lake County
canont be held li<l hle to tht' Upper Canal as a joint
tort-feasor since there is no contribution among joi11t
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tort-feasors in Utah. To the same effect see 3 Moore's
Federal Practice 571 et sequel §14.11 "Impleader of
Joint Tort-Feasor."
In its amended third-party complaint, the Upper
Canal Company seeks to hold Salt Lake County and
the individual commissioners liable for money damages. [ R.35 J This is based upon the allegations in
the said amended complaint to the effect that Salt
Laek County was engaged in storm drainage and
flood control activities resulting in the construction
of pipelines, hard-surfaced streets, etc. which carried
an excess amount of water into the plaintiff's canal
facilities. Such activities by the county are governmental in nature and this court has repeatedly held
that under similar circumstances damages cannot be
avvarded. [Frank 0. Reeder v. Brigham City, 17
U.2d 398, 413 P.2d C1966); State v. Wilkinson, 42
Utah 483 ( 1913); Hurst v. Highway Department of
the State of Utah, 16 U.2d 153, 397 P.2d 71 ( 1964);
Richard P. Hampton and Patricia L. Hampton v. State
of Utah by and through its Road Commission, 21 U.2d
708, 445 P.2d 708 C19688. J Furthermore, there are
110 ;1llcgations of any malice, fraud, gross negligence
or the like 011 the part of the individual third-party
df'fE:'ndants as Commissioners of Salt Lake County and
consequently the instant case was properly dismissed
as to them. r Salt Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah
4.fi2, 117 Pac.1075.J
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The amended third-party complaint is also defective because it does not contain any allegations that
the Upper Canal Company has complied with the provisions of Utah's governmental immunity act requiring the presentation of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to filing suit against the county or its
officers.
Section 63-30-13 UCA-1953 as amended in 1965
reads as follows:
"63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision
... a claim against a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed
within ninety (90) days after the cause of
action arises .... "
There is no allegation in the amended third-party
complaint that any notice has been filed with Salt
Lake County within ninety (90) days after the cause
of action arose. This may have been one of the
reasons why the original plaintiffs did not join Salt
Lake County as a defendant.
SUMMARY
For the reasons set forth above, the third-party
defendants submit that the ruling of the trial judge
allowing the Upper Canal Company to file its thirdparty cornplaiut is etT011eous and thal the motion of
the said. thinl-port)' dPfendm1ts to dismiss the corn10

plaint should be granted. The plaintiffs, Colwells,
did not think it advisable to name Salt Lake County
as a defendant and the Upper Canal Company has
shown no basis for doing so. Rule 14 has application
to contract actions; but its operation to tort actions
as in the instant case has been restricted by the Utah
Supreme Court in the Hardman case, supra.
Respectfully submitted
JAMES A. McINTOSH
Attorney for Third-Party Defendants
15 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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